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ABSTRACT—The U.S. Constitution enshrines the jury in a sacred space
within the American judicial system. Yet there are troubling signs that,
notwithstanding their best efforts, jurors struggle to fulfill their duties. In
particular, substantial empirical research indicates that jurors struggle to
understand and, consequently, to apply the instructions given to them by the
judge just prior to deliberations. Various mechanisms have been proposed—
and in some cases adopted—to improve jurors’ comprehension of
instructions and the quality of the deliberations that follow. Among these are
rewriting jury instructions in “plain English,” permitting jurors to take notes
and ask questions of witnesses, providing jurors with interim and preliminary
instructions, providing written copies of jury instructions, and adopting a
bifurcated trial structure. And, indeed, many of these proposals are backed
by empirical research suggesting that they improve juror decision-making.
Yet none have proven to be a panacea, and much room remains for
improvement. This Note builds on previous legal scholarship analogizing
jurors to learners and proposes a novel set of procedural reforms based on
educational research—particularly the theory of Direct Instruction—that
would further improve juror comprehension and decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following: there is an ongoing civil trial—say, a state law
class action brought by individuals who allege injuries resulting from the
defendants’ misrepresentations regarding the safety of vaping products. The
stakes are immense for both parties. The defendants have “bet the company”
and will be driven out of business if they lose. Likewise, many plaintiffs are
gravely injured and face medical bankruptcy absent a favorable verdict. The
trial is exceedingly complex, involving more than one hundred hours of
testimony. When the time finally arrives for deliberations, the judge spends
several hours instructing the jurors on all elements of the plaintiff’s fraud
claims. Yet the judge’s byzantine instructions leave the jurors deeply—
though silently—confused. Too sheepish to ask for clarification, they soon
retreat into deliberations. Within an hour, the jurors return their verdict. The
defendants have prevailed, and the injured plaintiffs face financial ruin.
The plaintiffs’ attorneys interview several jurors post-verdict, soon
discovering that the jurors applied a contributory negligence concept in
reaching their verdict. In other words, notwithstanding their misgivings
about the defendants’ behavior, the jurors decided that the plaintiffs
“accepted the risk” in using vaping products. Naturally, this reasoning
reflects the jurors’ common sense. Yet it also reflects their confusion. For,
you see, this jurisdiction rejects contributory negligence defenses. Thus, the
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115:1185 (2021)

Laypeople as Learners

jurors have, albeit inadvertently, thrown out the judge’s carefully crafted
instructions in favor of gut instinct. Does this scenario seem far-fetched?
Sadly, it is far more likely than one might imagine.
The U.S. Constitution enshrines the jury in a sacred space within the
American judicial system.1 Jurors are asked to fairly apply legal principles
to reach verdicts that determine the rights, responsibilities, and freedoms of
the parties in front of the court. All indications suggest that jurors strive in
good faith to carry out this solemn duty.2 Yet, notwithstanding their best
efforts, there are also signs that jurors at times struggle with this task. Judges’
instructions are often difficult to understand and so abstract as to bear little
relationship to the dispute in front of the court.3 And empirical research
suggests that jurors’ difficulties in understanding instructions can lead to
incorrect verdicts, even in matters as serious as capital sentencing.4
Scholars have suggested and courts have attempted numerous reforms,
including providing preliminary instructions; providing written instructions;
using special verdicts and interrogatories; rewriting instructions into easierto-understand “plain English”; bifurcating complex trials into smaller, more
focused proceedings; and permitting jurors to ask questions and take notes
during the trial.5 And research suggests that these reforms do help jurors
comprehend the law they are asked to apply.6 But none of these reforms has
proven to be a panacea, and there remains considerable room for
improvement.
This Note argues that jurors—laypeople—are best understood as novice
legal learners who bear substantial similarity to students in other
environments. Accordingly, this Note suggests a novel set of procedural
reforms that, although anchored in existing trial mechanisms, also

1

See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII. Although the Supreme Court has applied the Sixth Amendment’s
criminal-jury requirement to the states through its “selective incorporation” doctrine, it has not yet done
so with the Seventh Amendment right to a jury in civil cases. See generally F. Andrew Hessick &
Elizabeth Fisher, Structural Rights and Incorporation, 71 ALA. L. REV. 163 (2019) (discussing the
selective-incorporation doctrine and the extent to which it has been used to apply various provisions of
the Bill of Rights to the states).
2
See Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 98 (1988) (“[A] typical jury makes a good faith effort to use its
instructions for the purpose intended, that is, to reach a verdict according to the law.”).
3
Jay E. Grenig, The Civil Jury in America: Improving the Jury’s Understanding of a Case, 24 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 93, 99 (2000) (quoting William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems
and Remedies, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 731, 732 (1981)).
4
See infra Sections I.A.1–I.A.3.
5
See infra Part II.
6
See infra Part II.
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incorporate educational principles in order to improve juror comprehension
of legal principles.
Educational or “learning theories” are bodies of scholarly work that
“describe views regarding how one acquires knowledge and creates
connections among the items of information encountered in the world.”7
There are nearly as many educational theories as there are stars in the sky,8
and although these theories rarely provide “exact pedagogical strategies or
instructional methods,”9 they nevertheless communicate key principles that
have significant instructional implications.10 This Note argues that the
principles of one particular educational theory—that of “direct” or
“systematic” instruction—are especially helpful for jurors faced with the
daunting task of applying unfamiliar legal doctrines to reach a fair verdict. It
then extrapolates from Direct Instruction principles to propose modifications
to the jury-instruction and deliberation processes that would empower jurors
to more easily carry out this vital task.
Part I overviews the existing research on juror comprehension and
establishes the grave consequences of jurors’ failures to comprehend
instructions. Part II reviews existing reforms aimed at improving juror
comprehension and assesses their strengths and limitations. Part III proposes
novel reforms to jury-trial procedures that are rooted in the principles of
Direct Instruction and which seek to further improve juror comprehension.
It then addresses likely points of opposition and discusses various testing
mechanisms by which the validity of the proposal might be established. This
Note briefly concludes by illustrating the application of this proposal in a
hypothetical products liability case.
I.

JUROR COMPREHENSION AND APPLICATION OF INSTRUCTIONS

This Part overviews the existing literature regarding juror
comprehension, which establishes that jurors often fail to comprehend
judicial instructions. Next, it discusses potential contributing factors to juror
confusion. It then overviews literature suggesting that juror confusion leads
to incorrect and, in some cases, potentially catastrophic results. It establishes
that juror confusion is pervasive in both civil and criminal contexts,

7
Kelley Buchheister, Learning Theories, in 3 THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATIONAL
RESEARCH, MEASUREMENT, AND EVALUATION 961 (Bruce B. Frey ed., 2018).
8
A bit of hyperbole, of course, but there are dozens (or more) of educational theories that have
garnered significant attention. For a representative sample, see Paul Stevens-Fulbrook, 15 Learning
Theories in Education (A Complete Summary), TEACHEROFSCI.COM (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://teacherofsci.com/learning-theories-in-education/ [https://perma.cc/H27A-8PAQ].
9
Buchheister, supra note 7, at 961.
10
Id.
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including in applying burdens of proof and, more tragically, in capital
sentencing cases. Finally, this Part discusses more recent research by
Professor Shari Diamond and her coauthors that, although affirming the
general conclusion that jurors struggle to comprehend judicial instructions,
indicates that juror comprehension may be somewhat better than previously
thought.
A. Jurors’ Limited Instruction Comprehension
Over the past several decades, researchers have examined the extent to
which jurors comprehend—or fail to comprehend—their instructions.11 In
one study, researchers tested juror comprehension by asking jurors to
paraphrase essential terms from a set of pattern instructions.12 The overall
accuracy rate was 54%.13 Another study found comprehension rates ranging
from 51% to 65%, depending upon the complexity of the case.14 A 2000
study by Professors Mona Lynch and Craig Haney found an average
accuracy rate of 42% when using mock jurors in a hypothetical capital
sentencing case.15 Other studies have found comprehension rates ranging
from around 30% on the low end to around 70% in the highest estimates.16
One study on the insanity defense found comprehension levels as low as
15%.17
11
Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1542 (2012).
12
Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1313 (1979). This study parsed
legal instructions into discrete units of meaning (e.g., “you must follow the law”), which the researchers
dubbed “variables,” and assessed juror ability to paraphrase the essential variables of the instruction.
Paraphrasing of each variable was deemed “correct,” “correct by inference,” “wrong,” or “omitted.” Id.
at 1314.
13
Id. at 1316.
14
Amiram Elwork, James J. Alfini & Bruce D. Sales, Toward Understandable Jury Instructions,
65 JUDICATURE 432, 436 (1982).
15
Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing,
Comprehension, and Discrimination, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 481, 486 (2009) [hereinafter Lynch &
Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation].
16
See, e.g., Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 153, 179–180 (1982) (finding
correct response rates of up to 70.4% on multiple-choice questions testing comprehension of concepts
such as reasonable doubt); Richard L. Wiener, Christine C. Pritchard & Minda Weston,
Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 455,
460 (1995) (finding 29% comprehension of the reasonable-doubt instruction using a multiple-choice
comprehension inventory in a simulated capital sentencing case where study participants received model
instructions revised according to psycholinguistic principles).
17
James R.P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision Making,
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 519 (1991) (finding 14.9% of participants correctly recalled a specific
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Although the law generally assumes complete or near-complete juror
comprehension of instructions,18 this assumption conflicts with the empirical
research described above. Instead, this research suggests that jurors develop,
at best, an incomplete understanding of the law after receiving instructions
from the judge. Reported levels of postinstruction comprehension are often
quite low—no better than chance—and studies yield mixed results regarding
whether jury instructions improve understanding of the law at all.19 Although
some studies demonstrate modest postinstruction improvement in jurors’
understanding of the law, others have found that instructed jurors possess no
greater understanding of the law than noninstructed controls.20 In particular,
one study of Michigan jurors found that instructions improved jurors’
understanding of procedural rules, but not definitions of crimes.21
B. Contributing Factors
There are various reasons why jurors might fail to comprehend
instructions. Some scholars suggest jurors struggle to comprehend
instructions because the instructions include legal jargon which carries either
no meaning for laypersons or which carries lay meaning different from its
legal meaning.22 Indeed, one judge studied jurors’ comprehension of
Georgia’s “proximate cause” instructions and found that, although more than
half the jurors realized the concept was significant, just over 20% correctly
understood the instruction.23 As the judge concluded, “A trial judge who

element of the insanity defense under the M’Naghten standard); see also Dan Simon, More Problems
with Criminal Trials: The Limited Effectiveness of Legal Mechanisms, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167,
174 n.37 (2012) (citing Ogloff and other studies regarding jury-instruction comprehension levels).
18
Simon, supra note 17, at 174–75. This is presumably because the fairness of any particular verdict
is predicated on the jury having correctly applied—and, necessarily, having understood—the pertinent
law. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324–25 n.9 (1985) (“[W]e must assume that juries for the
most part understand and faithfully follow instructions.” (quoting R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESS ERROR 7374 (1970))). For a detailed analysis of this assumption, see generally Judith L.
Ritter, Your Lips Are Moving . . . but the Words Aren’t Clear: Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors
Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 164 (2004).
19
Simon, supra note 17, at 175.
20
Id.
21
Alan Reifman, Spencer M. Gusick & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Real Jurors’ Understanding of the Law
in Real Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539, 547 (1992).
22
See e.g., Charles M. Cork, III, A Better Orientation for Jury Instructions, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1, 9
(2002) (“Empirical researchers have consistently reported a problem with the use of legal jargonterms
of legal art that carry no intuitive meaning to lay jurors or a lay meaning different from the legally correct
meaning.”).
23
Charles B. Mikell, Jury Instructions and Proximate Cause: An Uncertain Trumpet in Georgia,
27 GA. ST. BAR J. 60, 62–63 (1990).
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reads a jury this instruction might just as well read a poem in Mandarin
Chinese. It probably makes no difference in the outcome of [the] case . . . .”24
Another possible culprit is over-generality in jury instructions. There
are several possible reasons why overly general instructions might cause
problems with juror comprehension. First, language drafted for universal
applicability is invariably harder for jurors to understand because it remains
at a confusing level of abstraction.25 Second, generalized instructions map
poorly onto the facts of specific cases. Thus, jurors struggle to apply
unfamiliar legal content which lacks any clear connection to the factual
contexts they face in the courtroom.26 Third, the intentionally broad scope of
generalized instructions likely causes jurors to consider less relevant or
irrelevant information in their deliberations27—for instance, affirmative
defenses inapplicable to the case at hand.
The length and complex structure of jury instructions also pose
difficulties for jurors.28 Some courts have recognized that the total length of
jury instructions tends to adversely impact jurors’ comprehension.29
Moreover, the charge provided to the jury is often assembled from a
collection of shorter instructions.30 The piecemeal assembling of instructions
tends to confuse jurors, and remedying that confusion might prove difficult
or impossible unless jurors take the time to ask clarifying questions.31
Likewise, certain instructions, when assembled together, can become
contextually unclear, even if they are otherwise accurate statements of the
law.32
Juror comprehension can also be limited by factors outside the
instructions themselves. For instance, factors such as jurors’ educational
level,33 their preexisting notions of how the legal system functions,34 and the

24

Id. at 64 (footnote omitted).
Cork, supra note 22, at 11.
26
Id. at 11–12.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 12.
29
Id. at 13 (noting that jury instructions in Georgia tend to be excessively long).
30
Id. at 14.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 15; see also Gunn v. Dep’t of Transp., 476 S.E.2d 46, 47–49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (reversing
a jury verdict where the juxtaposition of two otherwise valid instructions created internal inconsistencies
in the jury instructions).
33
See Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury
Instruction Process, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589, 617 (1997).
34
Id. at 618–19.
25
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inherent complexity of a case35 could all contribute to difficulties with
comprehension. Furthermore, various procedural limitations might keep
jurors from reaching optimum levels of comprehension, such as prohibitions
against jurors asking questions of witnesses or discussing the evidence prior
to the beginning of deliberations.36
C. Consequences of Jurors’ Struggles to Comprehend
In most cases, jurors make a good-faith effort to use the instructions
provided.37 However, they are hobbled by their struggles to comprehend the
instructions,38 which leave them uncertain as to how to apply the law to the
facts.39 This in turn may encourage jurors to decide the case on a gut sense
of who they think should win without regard for the facts and the law.40
Significant empirical research on both criminal and civil jury instructions
supports the conclusion that jurors incorrectly apply the law as a result of
their difficulty comprehending instructions, at times with serious
consequences.
1. Civil Cases
Jurors struggle to piece together the instructions in complex civil cases,
particularly those including multiple claims.41 In one study, Professor
Diamond and her coauthors reviewed recordings of multiple jury
deliberations from real cases.42 In one personal injury case, the authors found
that jurors struggled to apply instructions when the case involved multiple
tort claims, including a contingent claim of negligent supervision.43 There,
finding the defendant employer liable for negligent supervision would
necessarily have required finding one of the defendant employees liable for
one of the other tort claims.44 This requirement wasn’t stated explicitly in the
instructions, and the jurors only cleared up their confusion about the
contingent claim after discussing the topic at length and submitting a

35
Jerry J. Fang, Note, 12 Confused Men: Using Flowchart Verdict Sheets to Mitigate Inconsistent
Civil Verdicts, 64 DUKE L.J. 287, 306 (2014) (citing Lieberman & Sales, supra note 33, at 61617).
36
William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 120.
37
Steele & Thornburg, supra note 2, at 98.
38
See id.
39
Cork, supra note 22, at 6.
40
Id. at 6–7.
41
Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 1565–66.
42
See id. at 1546–47. The recorded, authentic deliberations were part of the larger Arizona Jury
Project. Id.
43
Id. at 1566.
44
Id.
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question to the judge.45 Absent this clarification, the jury might well have
tried to find the employer liable for negligent supervision even without
finding that one of its employees had committed the predicate tort.
In other instances, a few confused jurors attempted to entirely omit
negligence as a requirement to award damages in tort cases.46 That is to say,
the jurors, believing in each case that the plaintiff had suffered damages,
wished to find the defendant liable even absent the requisite finding of
negligence.47 Ultimately, these cases were resolved correctly when other
jurors pointed out that the instructions required negligence as a predicate to
liability. But it is still unsettling that at least some members of the jury were
initially willing to bypass an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Even
worse, Professor Diamond’s study revealed that other more serious errors
remained uncorrected.
Among the more serious errors identified was the tendency to conflate
issues of liability and damages in comparative fault cases.48 Jurors were
instructed to determine first the defendant’s liability, then total damages,
then what percentage of fault was attributable to the plaintiff.49 Instead, jurors
sometimes factored in the degree of comparative fault when calculating
damages. In other words, some juries determined up front how much money
they wished to award to the plaintiff and then adjusted damages upward to
ensure that the plaintiff would receive that amount regardless of comparative
fault.50 Ultimately, Professor Diamond and her coauthors concluded that
jurors frequently misapplied the law in comparative fault cases, that most of
their errors were not corrected, and that in many cases these uncorrected
errors affected the amount of damages awarded.51 Thus, whether resulting
from problems with comprehension or reluctance to apply the law as written,
current jury instructions in comparative fault cases fail to fully separate
jurors’ consideration of liability and damages.52

45

Id.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 156768.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1569.
52
Id. It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the authors’ overall conclusions, approximately 79%
of juror comments during deliberations accurately reflected the judge’s instructions, and only 9%
represented uncorrected errors. Id. at 1594. But this only suggests that, even when jurors can accurately
state or apply the judges’ instructions, their lack of comprehension still causes them to misapply the law
in complex civil cases.
46
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2. Burden-of-Proof Instructions
One particularly dangerous opportunity for juror error lies in applying
the burden of proof in criminal cases. A 1976 mock juror study by Judge
David Strawn and Professor Raymond Buchanan concluded that only 50%
of instructed study participants comprehended the reasonable doubt standard
applicable in criminal cases.53 Another study in 1990 compared the
comprehension of “reasonable doubt” for individuals who had served as
jurors to that of individuals who had been called but were not selected for
jury service.54 Of the instructed individuals—that is, those who had actually
served as jurors—only approximately 25% correctly determined that
reasonable doubt is a higher threshold than “any doubt, no matter how
slight.”55 Worse, instructions on reasonable doubt even appeared to increase
confusion on one area—more instructed than noninstructed jurors believed
that reasonable doubt could only be based on the evidence, not on inferences
drawn from the evidence.56 These findings raise serious due process
concerns.57 After all, “[i]f jurors fail to understand the law, there is no way
to be certain that the reasonable doubt standard has been satisfied.”58
Empirical research further suggests that jurors’ struggles to apply the
correct burden of proof might go beyond the realm of reasonable doubt. A
1985 study tested juror application of various burdens of proof, including
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond
a reasonable doubt.59 The researchers provided study participants with legal
definitions of the various burdens of proof—derived from pattern jury
instructions—as well as quantified definitions (51%, 71%, and 91% for
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and beyond
a reasonable doubt, respectively).60

53
David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE
478, 481 (1976).
54
Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions?
Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 409–
10 (1990).
55
Id. at 414.
56
Id.
57
See, e.g., Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) (“The evidence upon which a jury is
justified in returning a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to produce a conviction of guilt, to the exclusion
of all reasonable doubt.”).
58
John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty Pleas to Aid Criminal Juror
Comprehension, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1187, 1215 (2002).
59
Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof,
9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 162–63 (1985).
60
Id. at 163.
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Study participants provided with quantified definitions of the burden of
proof returned fewer verdicts for the plaintiff as the burden of proof
increased, showing that the quantified definitions produced the intended
legal effect.61 In contrast, the unquantified burden-of-proof definitions taken
from pattern jury instructions produced no significant effect on the rate of
verdicts returned in favor of the plaintiff.62 In fact, study participants
receiving the pattern-instruction definition of reasonable doubt actually
returned more verdicts in favor of the plaintiff (43%) than those receiving
the preponderance of the evidence definition (31%).63 Moreover, even when
quantified definitions of the burden of proof were provided, there was only
an insignificant difference in the number of verdicts returned for the plaintiff
between the clear and convincing and preponderance standards.64 Given the
constitutional mandate that criminal defendants be convicted only when
jurors are convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,65
jurors’ apparent inability to comprehend and delineate between various
standards of proof is quite troubling.
3. Capital Sentencing
Even more disturbing than the possibility that criminal defendants
might be convicted using a standard less than that of beyond a reasonable
doubt is the possibility that jurors might misapply instructions in capital
sentencing cases. In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam
opinion, concluded that existing state death-sentencing schemes violated the
Eighth Amendment because they allowed jurors “untrammeled discretion”66
that could lead to the “arbitrary and discriminatory” imposition of the death

61
Id. at 164–65. Participants returned pro-plaintiff verdicts at rates of 66% for the preponderance of
the evidence standard, 52% for the clear and convincing evidence standard, and 31% for the reasonable
doubt standard. Id.
62
Id. at 164. Participants returned pro-plaintiff verdicts at rates of 31% for the preponderance of the
evidence standard, 38% for the clear and convincing evidence standard, and 43% for the reasonable doubt
standard. Id. However, a 1996 mock juror study by Professors Irwin Horowitz and Laird Kirkpatrick
found that unquantified reasonable doubt definitions that included “firmly convinced” language tended
to produce verdicts more in accord with the evidence. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A
Concept in Search of a Definition: The Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt
Standards and Jury Verdicts, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 667 (1996) (“It appears that only the ‘firmly
convinced’ instructions provided jurors with the guidance or stimulus to reach appropriate verdicts in
both the weak and strong case.”).
63
Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 59, at 164.
64
Id.
65
Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) (“The evidence upon which a jury is justified in
returning a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to produce a conviction of guilt, to the exclusion of all
reasonable doubt.”).
66
408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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penalty.67 For a period of time, this holding led to a blanket prohibition on
the imposition and carrying out of death sentences in the United States.68
Many states responded by revising their capital sentencing instructions in an
attempt to reduce the “unbridled discretion” of the jury.69 When these revised
instructions were later challenged, the Court concluded in Gregg v. Georgia
that capital sentencing is not inherently unconstitutional, and that jury
discretion is permissible so long as it is properly guided.70 Jurors must now
adhere to this principle of “guided discretion” in all capital cases. 71 Yet, there
are troubling signs that jurors struggle to comprehend their instructions in
this most precarious area of law.
A series of studies by Professors Haney and Lynch tested jury-eligible
Californians’ comprehension of the state’s capital sentencing instructions.72
Despite hearing the instructions repeatedly, the study participants struggled
to define the terms “aggravation” and “mitigation,” and only 8% could
provide legally correct definitions of both.73 Worse still, two of the mitigating
factors were misinterpreted as aggravating factors by 23% and 25% of the
study participants, respectively,74 and only half understood that a death
verdict should not be issued when mitigating factors outweighed aggravating
factors in a given case.75 Additionally, 41% incorrectly believed that when
aggravating factors outweighed mitigating ones the death penalty was
mandatory.76
Admittedly, these studies involved jury-eligible adults and
undergraduate students, not actual jurors.77 However, researchers at the
Capital Jury Project obtained similar findings by interviewing more than

67

Id. at 243.
Id. at 239–40. This prohibition ended with the Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 (1976).
69
Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation, supra note 15, at 481.
70
428 U.S. at 206–07.
71
Simon, supra note 17, at 181.
72
Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of
California’s Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 411, 418 (1994) [hereinafter Haney
& Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death].
73
Id. at 421.
74
Id. at 424.
75
Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional
Comprehension and Penalty Phase Closing Arguments, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 575, 581–82 (1997)
[hereinafter Haney & Lynch, Clarifying Life and Death].
76
Id. at 582.
77
See Lynch & Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation, supra note 15, at 483 (jury-eligible adults); Haney
& Lynch, Clarifying Life & Death, supra note 75, at 577 (same); Haney & Lynch, Comprehending Life
& Death, supra note 72, at 418 (undergraduates).
68
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1,200 jurors who had served on capital cases. Nearly half of the interviewed
jurors mistakenly believed that the death sentence was mandatory under
certain circumstances.78 Other jurors felt that the law contemplated additional
aggravating factors which, although plausible, were not included in the
instructions.79
Moreover, additional studies reveal significant racial disparities in the
application of the death sentence in capital cases and suggest that these
patterns might be tied to juror comprehension. For example, a study by
Professor David Baldus examined verdicts in 2,484 homicide cases decided
in Georgia between 1973 and 1979 and found that although white defendants
were sentenced to death only 8% of the time for killing white victims, Black
defendants convicted of killing white victims were sentenced to death 21%
of the time.80 Similar disparities have been observed in other jurisdictions,
including Philadelphia, Maryland, and New Jersey.81 In 2000, Professors
Lynch and Haney conducted a study of jury-eligible adults and tied such
racial disparities to juror comprehension, finding that the study participants
who struggled most to comprehend death penalty instructions also sentenced
Black defendants to death at higher rates than white defendants.82 These
findings suggest that considerable doubt remains as to whether even revised
capital sentencing instructions have remedied the constitutional issues
presented in Furman. Moreover, these findings suggest a grave human toll
as a result of juror miscomprehension. Any wrongful capital sentence is
irreversible once carried out, and one especially horrifying study by
Professor Samuel Gross and his coauthors found that as many as 4.1% of
capital sentences might result from false convictions.83
4. Cause for Hope
Despite the research described above, the news is not all bad. Although
uncorrected juror errors appeared to influence some of the verdicts in
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Simon, supra note 17, at 183.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital
Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–6 (1993).
80
DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 45, 315, 328 (1990).
81
See Simon, supra note 17, at 184–85 n.103.
82
Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided
Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 354–55 (2000). The
authors drew no firm conclusions on what drove this pattern but found it “theoretically consistent with
much social psychological writing about the mechanics of ‘aversive’ or ‘subtle’ racism.” Id. at 353.
83
Samuel R. Gross, Barbara O’Brien, Chen Hu & Edward H. Kennedy, Rate of False Conviction of
Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 7230, 7234 (2014).
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Professor Diamond’s Arizona Jury Project study,84 the majority of jurors’
comments about the instructions were correct.85 This reflected a significantly
higher level of juror comprehension than many previous studies observed,
and Professor Diamond has suggested that this higher level of
comprehension might come as a result of jurors having the opportunity to
correct each other’s errors during deliberations.86 Moreover, the
comprehension measures used in studies assessing juror comprehension
have varied significantly. Some studies have used paraphrase tests, which
challenge jurors to restate legal instructions in their own words.87 Logically,
paraphrase tests are generally more challenging than simpler measures such
as multiple-choice questionnaires. Thus, it might well be that the lower
comprehension scores reflected in earlier studies are in part a product of the
comprehension measures used. As a result, it is possible that Professor
Diamond’s review of real jury deliberations more accurately reflects levels
of juror comprehension in response to instructions, notwithstanding its
variance from some of the earlier studies. In any event, it is clear that there
is still room for significant improvements in juror comprehension.
II. EXISTING APPROACHES TO IMPROVING JUROR INSTRUCTION
COMPREHENSION
Various reforms have been proposed to improve comprehension of jury
instructions. This Part begins by reviewing perhaps the most well-researched
jury-instruction reform—the redrafting of pattern jury instructions into
“plain English.”88 It discusses the nature of plain English revisions, the extent
to which research indicates that revised instructions improve juror
comprehension, and the potential limitations and drawbacks of patterninstruction revisions. It then provides an overview of other comprehensionoriented reforms that various jurisdictions have tested, including permitting
juror note-taking; providing jurors with written copies of judicial
instructions; utilizing special verdicts and special interrogatories; providing
jurors with substantive preliminary and interim instructions; and bifurcating
trials into separate phases based on distinct legal issues. It concludes that,
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See Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 159596.
Specifically, 79% of the jurors’ comments accurately reflected the judges’ instructions, while only
9% reflected uncorrected errors. Id. at 1594.
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Id. at 1595.
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See, e.g., Steele & Thornburg, supra note 2, at 90.
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This term is heavily used in the literature on jury instructions and refers to rewriting jury
instructions to be more reader-friendly. See infra Section II.A for a more detailed description of plain
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although these mechanisms can improve juror comprehension, further
innovations are needed to surpass the limitations of these reforms.
A. “Plain English” Revisions of Pattern Jury Instructions
Perhaps the most well-tested jury reform aimed at improving juror
comprehension is rewriting pattern jury instructions for greater clarity and
readability.89 Several studies convincingly suggest that revising jury
instructions into plain English promotes greater comprehension. For
example, Professors Robert Charrow and Veda Charrow undertook a study
in which they rewrote pattern jury instructions to reduce confusing terms and
awkward linguistic constructions.90 Study participants achieved significantly
higher levels of comprehension using these rewritten instructions, with some
instructions providing as much as 93% improvement in comprehension.91
In a second study, Professor Diamond and Professor Judith Levi
experimented with rewriting the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions.92 They
reduced common linguistic difficulties and clarified especially difficult legal
concepts.93 Some study subjects received the pattern instructions while others
received the revised instructions, and both groups were tested for
comprehension.94 The subjects receiving revised instructions performed
better on a nineteen-question test of comprehension, with these subjects
responding with more correct and fewer incorrect responses compared to
those receiving the pattern jury instructions.95
A third study experimented with rewriting pattern instructions for
hypothetical criminal trials involving charges of murder and burglary.96 The
authors rewrote the instructions by eliminating uncommon words, redrafting
instructions in the active voice, and replacing abstract words with more
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Cronan, supra note 58, at 1235–36.
Charrow & Charrow, supra note 12, at 1311.
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See id. at 1352.
92
Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing
Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 226–28 (1996).
93
Id. at 227. For example, the original pattern instructions included the following language regarding
aggravating factors: “Aggravating factors are reasons why the defendant should be sentenced to death.”
The authors revised this to read: “In a criminal case such as this one, an ‘aggravating factor’ is any fact
or condition or circumstance that, in your judgment, makes a sentence of death more appropriate for this
defendant than a sentence of imprisonment.” Id. at 228.
94
Id. at 226.
95
Id. at 230. The total percentage of correct responses rose by an average of 15%, and the total
percentage of incorrect responses decreased by an average of 15%. Id.
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AMIRAM ELWORK, BRUCE D. SALES & JAMES J. ALFINI, MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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concrete ones.97 Study subjects reviewed a video of a trial and then received
either the pattern instructions or the rewritten ones.98 For subjects viewing
the videotape of a murder trial, the second rewrite of the instructions yielded
an 80% comprehension rate, up from 51% with the pattern instructions.99
Similarly, subjects who viewed the videotape of a burglary trial achieved an
80% comprehension rate, up from 65% using the pattern instructions.100
Additional studies support the conclusion that rewriting pattern jury
instructions can yield significant improvements in juror comprehension.101
Furthermore, even authors who lack special training in linguistics have been
able to significantly improve juror comprehension by rewriting jury
instructions.102 Thus, rewriting pattern instructions shows considerable
promise as a method to improve juror comprehension. Some states, most
notably California, have even taken on formal efforts to revise their jury
instructions for clarity.103
However, rewriting pattern instructions is likely not a cure-all for cases
of juror confusion. Although the existing studies reveal significant
improvements in comprehension when using revised jury instructions,
hurdles remain. For example, subjects in Professors Diamond and Levi’s
study achieved higher levels of comprehension with the revised instructions,
but they still answered 30% of the comprehension questions incorrectly.104
Likewise, a study showing dramatic increases in comprehension when using
revised jury instructions still found that when subjected to a paraphrasing
test jurors incorrectly paraphrased the instructions the majority of the time.105
Furthermore, revising jury instructions carries some risks.106 Long, complex
jury instructions stem, in part, from trial court judges’ efforts to avoid
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reversal on appeal.107 Jury instructions often closely mirror the language of
statutes and appellate opinions, and revising their language runs the risk of
creating legal inaccuracies.108 Additionally, some research suggests that
jurors tend to rely on existing mental schemas109 to assess the features of a
crime or claim, and such preconceived notions might not be easily overcome
by mere revision of pattern instructions.110
B. Other Researched Approaches
1. Juror Note-Taking
Another relatively well-researched jury reform is allowing juror notetaking during trials. As far back as 1960, the Judicial Conference Committee
on the Operation of the Jury System recommended that
trial jurors should, in the discretion of the trial judge, be permitted to take notes
for use in their deliberations regarding the evidence presented to them and to
take these notes with them when they retire for their deliberations. When
permitted to be taken, [notes] should be treated as confidential between the juror
making them and . . . fellow jurors.111

Although the Supreme Court has never definitively ruled on the propriety of
juror note-taking, most appellate courts at both the state and federal levels
leave juror note-taking within the discretion of the trial court judge.112
The available empirical research suggests note-taking has either neutral
or modest beneficial effects on juror comprehension. Studies from 1997113
107

Id.
Id.
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The term “schema,” as used in educational research, refers to “knowledge structures” which
“organize knowledge about specific stimulus domains and guide both the processing of new information
and the retrieval of stored information.” Norbert M. Seel, Schema(s), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SCIENCES
OF LEARNING 2933 (Norbert M. Seel ed., 2012). Think of a schema as one’s internal framework for
organizing past experiences and internalizing new experiences in discrete areas of life. For example, one
likely has a schema for the workplace—expectations about interpersonal relationships, about the physical
work environment, about the roles of different employees, etc.—which serves as a framework that allows
one to more easily understand and internalize new work-related experiences.
110
Peter W. English & Bruce D. Sales, A Ceiling or Consistency Effect for the Comprehension of
Jury Instructions, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 381, 383–84 (1997). Professor Diamond dubs this tendency
to rely on preexisting schemas the “consistency ceiling.” Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death:
Psychologists, Juries, and Judges, 48 AM. PSYCH. 423, 433 (1993).
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Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and
Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 56768 (1997) (quoting Jud. Conf. Comm. on the Operation
of the Jury Sys., The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.R.D. 409, 424 (1960)).
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Id. at 568.
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Steven D. Penrod & Larry Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision
Making, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 259, 271 (1997).
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and 1994114 suggest that juror note-taking creates modest improvement in
juror recall of evidence. Furthermore, other studies indicate that juror notetaking is well-received by jurors, judges, and attorneys,115 and that notetaking might slightly increase juror satisfaction with the trial experience.116
However, there are several common criticisms raised about the prospect
of juror note-taking. First, some critics believe that note-taking will tend to
distract jurors from the trial.117 Second, they believe that notetakers will tend
to have an outsized influence in jury deliberations.118 Third, they believe that
jurors will struggle to keep up with the pace of the trial while taking notes,
thus causing them to rely on incomplete, inaccurate notes that poorly reflect
the trial record.119 Fourth, they believe that jurors might take more notes early
in the trial, causing them to favor the party that presents first—the
prosecution in criminal trials and the plaintiff in civil trials.120 Finally, they
suggest that juror note-taking might consume too much trial time.121
However, these concerns are not confirmed by the existing research.
2. Providing Jurors with Written Instructions
Another commonly suggested reform to improve juror comprehension
is providing jurors with a written copy of the final instructions. This practice
is widely accepted—it is permitted by all federal circuits and the Supreme
Court and is permitted or required by at least twenty-nine states.122 Although
empirical research on this reform is limited, one study in the Second Circuit
examined the effects of providing jurors with written instructions.123 In this
study, four federal judges provided jurors in twelve analyzed trials with
written instructions and evaluated the results.124 Of the twelve trials, the
judges evaluated the written instructions as “very helpful” in six cases and at
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David L. Rosenhan, Sara L. Eisner & Robert J. Robinson, Notetaking Can Aid Juror Recall,
18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 58–60 (1994).
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Penrod & Heuer, supra note 113, at 26667.
116
Id. at 267.
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Id. (surveying cases throughout the 1900s and summarizing courts’ criticisms of juror notetaking).
118
Id. at 267.
119
Id. at 268–69.
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Id. at 26970.
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Id. at 270.
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TED A. DONNER & RICHARD K. GABRIEL, JURY SELECTION STRATEGY & SCIENCE § 39:10 (3d
ed. Supp. 2019).
123
Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted by District
Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 455–56 (1985).
124
Id. at 45455.
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least “somewhat helpful” in the remaining six cases.125 The procedure also
appeared to increase jurors’ comfort with the instructions; after receiving
written instructions, jurors no longer asked the judges to reread portions of
the charge.126 However, some attorneys surveyed for the study felt that this
was a negative—they believed that jurors might be relying too much on the
written instructions without seeking necessary clarification from the judge.127
Still, courts could address this concern by explicitly informing jurors that
they are free to ask questions about the instructions, notwithstanding their
possession of a written copy of the instructions.128 Also, many study
participants felt that the benefits of written instructions increased with the
trial’s complexity.129 In reviewing this study and two others, then-Judge
Michael Dann of the Superior Court of Arizona identified four clear
advantages associated with the providing jurors with written instructions: (1)
jurors were less confused by the charge; (2) jurors felt that written
instructions aided deliberations; (3) jurors were left with fewer questions
about the instructions; and (4) jurors felt more confident in their verdict.130
Thus, this reform appears to carry several clear advantages and few
disadvantages. Unfortunately, there is limited research examining
specifically the extent to which written instructions improve juror
comprehension.
3. Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories
Special verdicts and general verdicts with special interrogatories are
two additional mechanisms which might improve juror comprehension of
instructions. Both mechanisms are explicitly authorized by Rule 49 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.131 When a special verdict is used, the court
submits various questions of fact for the jury to resolve.132 The jury resolves
each factual matter presented to it without issuing a general verdict.133 The
judge then applies the law to the jury’s factual findings in order to reach a
verdict.134 To the extent that a jury’s factual findings are internally
125
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inconsistent with a general verdict, the trial court judge has the duty to
reconcile them, if possible.135 If the jury’s factual findings do not enable the
court to reach a general verdict, the judge has discretion to submit additional
questions to the jury, to make independent factual findings on unresolved
issues, or to order a new trial if any factual inconsistencies cannot be
remedied.136 Special verdicts have seen increasing use in recent years,137 and
several states encourage or even mandate the use of special verdicts in certain
instances.138
Special interrogatories represent a compromise position between the
general verdict and the special verdict.139 The jury issues a general verdict
but is also asked to answer accompanying factual questions not unlike those
used for a special verdict.140 When the answers to the special interrogatories
are consistent with the jury’s general verdict, the court is obligated to enter
judgment on the verdict.141 When the answers to the special interrogatories
are internally consistent, but inconsistent with the verdict, then the court may
enter judgment consistent with the interrogatories and opposed to the verdict,
return the verdict and interrogatories to the jury for further consideration, or
order a new trial.142 Finally, when the answers to the interrogatories are both
internally inconsistent and inconsistent with the verdict, the court must
submit the verdict and interrogatories to the jury for further consideration or
order a new trial.143
Special verdicts and special interrogatories present both potential
benefits and drawbacks. Opponents argue that these mechanisms might
increase the frequency of hung juries144 and might involve so many questions
as to make the jury’s deliberations unmanageable.145 More significantly,
many commentators, including the late Justices William Douglas and Hugo
Black, have suggested that special verdicts and interrogatories impair the
135
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right to trial by jury by denying the jury the unfettered right to produce a
general verdict.146 Proponents argue that these mechanisms improve
deliberations by focusing the jurors’ attention on discrete, manageable
issues,147 assisting the jurors in sifting through large amounts of
information,148 and encouraging the jurors to remain objective in reaching
decisions.149 Likewise, proponents argue that special verdicts and
interrogatories assist the appellate court by disclosing additional information
about the decision-making process in the lower court,150 which tends to limit
the number of relitigated issues following a successful appeal.151
Some authorities suggest that special verdicts and interrogatories favor
defendants.152 This is because, assuming the evidence equally favors both
parties, the probability of prevailing on three discrete elements of a claim is
lower than the probability of prevailing on the claim as a whole.153 In other
words, if the jury only considers whether the plaintiff has satisfied the entire
claim, as in a general verdict, then the plaintiff should prevail 50% of the
time.154 If the jury instead assesses whether the plaintiff has proved each of
three consecutive elements, the odds drop to 12.5% (0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5).155 On
the other hand, in certain circumstances, the special verdict might skew in
favor of the plaintiff, such as when alternative legal theories for the same
claim would allow the plaintiff “two bites at the apple.”156
Professors Elizabeth Wiggins and Steven Breckler conducted an
empirical analysis of the effects of special verdicts on verdict outcomes and
juror comprehension of instructions.157 The study subjects were ninety-six
students at a large state university who viewed a videotaped mock trial.158
146
REPORT OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-48, at 20 (1963); see also Brodin, supra note 132, at 40 (discussing
the opposition statement of Justices Black and Douglas).
147
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Id. at 7.
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Id. at 9. For example, consider a plaintiff bringing two claims involving the same factual
transaction that are based on different legal theories, such as a contract suit where a buyer sues for breach
of contract and breach of warranty. A special verdict form that emphasizes both breach of contract and
breach of warranty may be biased against the defendant. Id.
157
Id. at 10–14.
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After viewing the mock trial, the study subjects were asked to issue two
verdicts using some combination of general and special verdict forms.159
Ultimately, the researchers concluded that the verdict form did not affect the
trial outcome, although study subjects allocated compensatory and punitive
damages differently depending on which form was used.160 After issuing
their verdicts, the subjects’ comprehension was assessed in two ways. First,
they were given a list of legal issues presented by the trial (e.g., “whether the
defendant made a defamatory statement”) and asked to assign the burden of
proof for that issue to the correct party.161 Second, the subjects were given a
set of factual findings from a mock jury’s special verdict and were asked to
determine whether those factual findings warranted a verdict for the plaintiff
or for the defendant.162 The researchers found that special verdicts improved
comprehension to a limited extent.163 Specifically, the study subjects who
issued special verdicts were more successful in assigning the correct burden
of proof on the first comprehension measure than those who issued general
verdicts.164 However, they were no more successful in selecting the correct
verdict in response to the mock jury’s factual findings.165 Furthermore, the
performance levels in both the special-verdict and general-verdict conditions
were low overall.166
4. Preliminary/Interim Instructions
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives trial judges the
discretion to provide preliminary instructions for any trial.167 Proponents
suggest that preliminary instructions might improve juror recall of evidence
and instructions;168 help jurors overcome bias towards the parties;169 reduce
juror confusion;170 encourage jurors to withhold judgment until the end of
trial;171 and increase jurors’ abilities to connect evidence to relevant legal
issues.172 In contrast, critics suggest that preliminary instructions could be
159
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redundant; slow down the progress of trials; push jurors to adopt a
hypothesis-confirming mindset with biasing effects against the defendant;
and encourage jurors to determine a preliminary verdict before all evidence
has been introduced.173
Available research provides a mixed picture of preliminary instructions.
Studies are inconclusive as to whether preliminary instructions improve juror
recall of evidence or instructions.174 A 1985 Second Circuit study assessed
judge and attorney reactions to preliminary instructions in ten civil and four
criminal trials.175 The three participating judges were encouraged to give
preliminary instructions that would provide “maximum guidance” to the
jurors.176 Following the trial, the participating judges and counsel on both
sides completed questionnaires on their reactions to the preliminary
instructions.177 The majority of participants reported satisfaction with the use
of preliminary instructions, with some reporting improved juror
attentiveness, and none reporting any delay in the trial as a result of the
preliminary instructions.178
One 1993 study found significant differences in evidence recall and
accuracy of compensation awards, but not in overall verdict accuracy,
between mock jurors who received preliminary instructions and those who
did not.179 After listening to a two-hour audiotape of a mock toxic tort trial
involving multiple plaintiffs,180 study participants were assessed on several
measures. First, participants were asked to retell the events of the case; their
comments were recorded and then categorized as probative, nonprobative,
or evaluative.181 Second, participants were given a list of factual assertions,
some of which came from the trial and some of which were plausible “lures,”
and were asked to identify which items were actually part of the trial.182
Finally, participants were asked to reach a liability decision and to determine
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compensation for the plaintiff if the participant found the defendant liable.183
Verdicts did not differ significantly between preinstructed and nonpreinstructed participants, but this was likely because the evidence for the
mock trial skewed heavily in favor of the plaintiffs.184 On other measures, the
researchers found significant differences between participants who received
preliminary instructions and those who did not. The preinstructed
participants made more probative and fewer nonprobative or evaluative
statements on the recall test.185 Likewise, they correctly identified a greater
number of facts from the trial on the recognition measure and avoided more
of the lures.186 Finally, the preinstructed participants tailored compensatory
awards more appropriately to the level of injury incurred by different
plaintiffs in the mock trial.187
A 1985 study found that preliminary instructions assisted jurors in
correctly applying the law but did not facilitate greater recall of the evidence.
The study examined judge, attorney, and juror reactions to the use of
preliminary instructions in Wisconsin trials.188 Twenty-nine judges
participated, and they were asked to give preliminary instructions on issues
such as the burden of proof, evaluating the credibility of witnesses, and
various procedural matters.189 Additionally, the judges were encouraged to
provide any additional substantive instructions that they felt would be helpful
for the jurors.190 Following the trial, judges, attorneys, and jurors were asked
to mail in a questionnaire reflecting on their experiences with the preliminary
instructions.191 The juror questionnaire also included a number of questions
testing recall and comprehension of the judges’ instructions.192 The
researchers concluded that, although jurors felt that the preliminary
instructions were helpful to their understanding and application of the law,
the preliminary instructions did not improve recall of the evidence or the
instructions.193 However, the judges’ questionnaires expressed greater
agreement with the verdicts issued by juries who received preliminary
183
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instructions, which, combined with the jurors’ subjective assessments,
suggests that preliminary instructions did in fact aid jurors in applying the
law correctly.194
5. Bifurcation
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits courts to
conduct separate trial phases for different issues and claims, a process known
as bifurcation.195 Courts can implement bifurcation at any time “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize” the trial, so
long as the federal right to a jury trial is preserved.196 Proponents suggest that
bifurcation benefits litigants by ensuring the logical, sequential presentation
of the evidence, thereby allowing jurors to more easily concentrate on
relevant information and improving the quality of deliberations.197
Proponents also suggest that bifurcation may shorten overall trial time by,
for example, obviating the need to conduct a trial for damages in the absence
of a finding of liability.198 Finally, they argue that bifurcation, by dividing a
trial into more manageable pieces, should promote jurors’ comprehension of
the evidence and legal issues.199
Several empirical studies shed light on the effects of bifurcation on jury
decision-making. A 1963 study reviewed verdicts in 186 personal injury
cases in the Northern District of Illinois, some of which were bifurcated.200
The researchers found that the bifurcated proceedings skewed heavily in
favor of the defendants—defendants prevailed in 34% of the unitary or
“regular” trials but in 56% of bifurcated trials.201 Moreover, the researchers
noticed notable time savings with bifurcated trials. Whereas 78% of unitary
proceedings completed the full trial stage, only 15% of bifurcated
proceedings did.202 Furthermore, the average trial length dropped from 4.2
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Stephan Landsman, Shari Diamond, Linda Dimitropoulos & Michael J. Saks, Proposed Reforms
and Their Effects: Be Careful What You Wish for: The Paradoxical Effects of Bifurcating Claims for
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 297, 333–34.
200
Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 1606, 1610 (1963).
201
Id.
202
Id. at 1610–11.
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days in unitary proceedings to 3.1 days in bifurcated proceedings.203
However, the researchers tempered their findings by noting that the
participating judges had selected which trials to bifurcate, thus leaving open
the possibility that the bifurcated trials were somehow substantively different
from the unitary ones.204
Another study published in 1990 tested mock jurors with a simulated
toxic tort case.205 Much like the 1985 Wisconsin preliminary instructions
study, this study found that the defendant prevailed significantly more often
in bifurcated, rather than unitary, trials.206 Specifically, the plaintiff prevailed
in 87.5% of unitary trials but in only 25% of bifurcated trials.207 However,
when the plaintiff prevailed in a bifurcated trial, the compensatory damages
awards were significantly larger than in a unitary trial.208
A third study published by Professor Stephan Landsman in 1998
reaffirmed many of the earlier findings. This study tested mock juror verdicts
using a videotaped, simulated asbestos lawsuit.209 The video simulation was
bifurcated into proceedings on compensatory damages and liability and then
separate proceedings on punitive damages and liability.210 Half of the study’s
participants viewed the video in a unitary fashion and the remaining half
began with compensatory damages and then considered punitive damages
only if they found liability for compensatory damages.211 As with the two
earlier studies, the researchers found that the defendant prevailed more
frequently in the bifurcated proceeding—in this case, the jury found the
defendant liable only 42.8% of the time in bifurcated proceedings versus
55.2% of the time in unitary proceedings.212 On the other hand, they also

203

Id.
Id. at 1611–12.
205
Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of Procedural Issues
in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 270 (1990).
206
Id. at 282.
207
Id. The authors suggested this trend might stem from the inability of jurors in the bifurcated
condition to use evidence from the simpler issue of damages to dispel their uncertainty about the more
ambiguous issue of general causation. They hypothesized that because jurors in the unitary condition
possessed the ability to “buttress” their decision on general causation by considering plaintiff-sympathetic
evidence relevant to the issue of damages, they were more sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ cause overall
than the jurors in the bifurcated condition. See id.
208
Id. at 283.
209
Landsman et al., supra note 199, at 309–10.
210
Id. at 308–09.
211
Id. at 31112.
212
Id. at 316. The authors of this study suggested that this pattern of results might arise because the
bifurcated trial structure prevented jurors’ “misuse of information” pertaining solely to damages to justify
a finding of liability. Id. at 335.
204
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found less variance in compensatory damage awards when using a bifurcated
proceeding, regardless of the strength of the evidence on that issue.213 One
noteworthy result: the study found no evidence that bifurcation significantly
improved juror comprehension.214
III. APPLYING EDUCATIONAL PRINCIPLES TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND
DELIBERATIONS
As Part I of this Note shows, jurors continue to struggle with
comprehending and applying legal instructions during the course of a trial,
and these struggles can result in significant consequences. Likewise, as
discussed in Part II, although existing trial mechanisms such as juror notetaking and preliminary instruction do assist jurors in comprehending
instructions, there remains significant room for improvement.
It is perhaps unsurprising that jurors would struggle to apply legal
instructions during the course of a trial. Jurors, as laypersons, are given
tremendous responsibility upon entering the courtroom—they are asked to
quickly internalize abstract legal principles and accurately apply them to
make powerful decisions about the lives of others.215 As Professor Diamond
notes, jurors are asked to do in mere days what law students struggle to do
over the course of years.216 In the process, they are “doused with a kettleful
of law . . . that would make a third-year law student blanch.”217
This Part suggests that to assist jurors in correctly applying the law, it
would be wise to view jurors as learners and to tailor courtroom procedures
to reflect this perspective. First, it addresses the basis for viewing jurors as
similar to students in traditional classroom environments. Next, it explores
the contours of one prominent educational theory, known as “direct” or
“systematic” instruction. It briefly reviews the history of Direct Instruction
and argues for the particular usefulness of this theory in the context of jury
instructions. It then overviews the key principles of Direct Instruction. Next,
it translates these principles into the legal context to suggest novel
instructional and deliberation procedures that are both educationally sound
and compatible with existing trial mechanisms. This Note concludes by
addressing potential challenges to the proposed procedures and by

213

Id. at 334.
Id. at 333–34.
215
Danielle R. Cover, Of Courtrooms & Classrooms, 27 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 291, 302 (2018).
216
Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 1538.
217
Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1948) (quoting CURTIS BOK, I TOO,
NICODEMUS 261–62 (1946)).
214
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suggesting testing mechanisms to establish the viability of the proposal prior
to implementation in live courtroom proceedings.
A. Jurors as Learners
This Note is not the first piece of scholarship to describe jurors as
learners. One scholar explains that while jurors naturally resemble the
general population, they also bear strong resemblances to students in
traditional lecture-based classrooms.218 They are asked to internalize new
concepts that are carefully packaged by the judge and attorneys—the
courtroom’s “teachers.”219 Although jurors should be viewed as adult
learners, they are, owing to their lack of familiarity with legal proceedings,
unusually dependent upon the court and counsel.220 And while jurors are
motivated to understand the trial and reach a correct verdict, the parties’ trial
presentations often fail to assist jurors in meeting this responsibility.221
Moreover, other scholars argue that lawyers should view themselves as
“educator-advocates” who have a duty to present information to jurors in a
comprehensible manner.222 An attorney operating under this premise would
more carefully mirror the behavior of teachers insofar as attorneys “plan and
evaluate the way they present information” like effective teachers in order to
craft the most convincing story for their audiences.223 Indeed, at least one
scholar has explicitly called for incorporating principles of educational
psychology into courtroom procedures.224 This seems a sensible approach,
given that every “trial is an exercise in education.”225
B. Lessons from Educational Theory: Direct Instruction
If we accept as true that jurors are essentially novice legal learners, what
insights about their learning experiences might we draw from the realm of
218
Cover, supra note 215, at 292 (“Broadly conceived, the juror experience looks very much like a
classroom learning experience.”). This article makes an excellent case for understanding jurors as adult
learners but focuses on using this insight to refine attorneys’ trial techniques, rather than arguing for
modified trial procedures.
219
Id.
220
See id. at 306.
221
See id. at 302 (suggesting that trial presentations frequently fail to assist jurors in fulfilling their
responsibilities).
222
See Gail A. Jaquish & James Ware, Adopting an Educator Habit of Mind: Modifying What It
Means to “Think Like a Lawyer,” 45 STAN. L. REV. 1713, 1716 (1993).
223
Cover, supra note 215, at 299.
224
See Jaquish & Ware, supra note 222, at 1728 (suggesting that law school curricula should include
instruction on educational psychology so that advocates will be better prepared to communicate concepts
to jurors in a comprehensible manner).
225
Schwarzer, supra note 3, at 135.
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educational theory? One especially relevant theory is that of “systematic” or
“direct” instruction. Direct Instruction was developed in the 1960s by
Siegfried Engelmann226 as a way of teaching foundational skills in math and
reading.227 Engelmann had noticed that disadvantaged students struggled to
acquire reading skills because of a relative deficit in preexisting language
skills when compared to their more affluent peers.228 Direct Instruction was
designed to remedy this deficit by helping these at-risk students efficiently
master basic skills so they could tackle more complex areas of study on a
“level playing field” with their peers.229
Direct Instruction techniques were initially developed through
correlational studies in which researchers identified educators who produced
unusually large gains in student achievement and then analyzed those
educators’ classroom procedures to detect common instructional
strategies.230 The researchers then compiled these strategies into a manual for
teaching, which was used as the foundation for experimental studies that
tested whether intentional implementation of the strategies would improve
students’ academic performance.231 Though the experimental studies were
primarily conducted in math and reading classrooms, they revealed that, on
balance, students taught using Direct Instruction obtained significantly
higher posttest scores than students taught in the control setting.232
Key tenets of Direct Instruction include checking frequently for
understanding, presenting material in small steps, and allowing students the
opportunity to actively and successfully participate in the learning process.233
In terms of instructional design, Direct Instruction counsels that educators
should break material into small steps to prevent unnecessary confusion,
structure learning by providing an overview or outline of new material, and
226

Siegfried Engelmann, Wesley C. Becker, Douglas Carnine & Russell Gersten, The Direct
Instruction Follow Through Model: Designs and Outcomes, 11 EDUC. & TREATMENT CHILD. 303, 303
(1988). Perhaps ironically, Professor Siegfried Engelmann started out not in education, but in advertising.
Beginnings, NAT’L INST. FOR DIRECT INSTRUCTION, https://www.nifdi.org/research/history-of-diresearch/beginnings.html [https://perma.cc/QSL5-FQE6]. Professor Engelmann had experience using
marketing techniques to ensure that consumers retained information and thought to apply those same
techniques in educating his two sons. Id. He then drew on his experiences with his children to develop
the theory of Direct Instruction in conjunction with education researcher Carl Bereiter. Id.
227
Barak Rosenshine, Systematic Instruction, in 1 21ST CENTURY EDUCATION: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 235, 235 (Thomas L. Good ed., 2008).
228
Beginnings, supra note 226.
229
Id.
230
Rosenshine, supra note 227, at 235–36.
231
Id. at 236.
232
Id.
233
Id.
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give ample opportunities to learners to practice applying new concepts, along
with many opportunities for feedback.234
Several theoretical considerations underpin this approach. First,
learners have limited working memory, and, when exposed to new
information, can experience “cognitive overload” that inhibits the processing
of new material.235 Furthermore, absent opportunities to “elaborate on,
review, and rehearse,” new material is unlikely to transition from working
memory to long-term memory, where it can be actively used.236 Second,
learners cannot process underlying patterns adequately to solve complex
problems without developing “well-connected and elaborate knowledge
structures” in long-term memory.237 Lastly, understanding is enhanced when
learners are given the chance to “explain, elaborate, or defend” their
positions.238
When viewed through the lenses of origins, purpose, and theoretical
underpinnings, Direct Instruction principles appear uniquely suited to assist
jurors in carrying out their duties. Jurors are, in every sense, the
disadvantaged students in the courtroom: they come in with little or no
formal experience with the legal system and almost certainly no concept of
such fuzzy terms as “reasonableness” and “comparative negligence.” And
they are asked to apply a “kettleful of law”239 without the benefit—enjoyed
by the judge and attorneys, this classroom’s “more affluent peers”240—of
years of legal experience. Of all the parties in a courtroom, jurors enter with
the hardest job and yet the fewest basic skills with which to undertake it. So,
Direct Instruction, which was designed to help even the most disadvantaged
students efficiently achieve success, seems tailor-made to help jurors out of
the quandary they face.
True, Direct Instruction techniques have not been researched with
respect to legal education. But countless studies over the last fifty years have
established that Direct Instruction techniques promote student learning in
wide-ranging subjects such as math, reading, the sciences, foreign languages,
and other complex cognitive skills.241 And at least one authority suggests that
234

Id. at 239.
Id. at 23637.
236
Id. at 237.
237
Id. at 238.
238
Id. at 237 (quoting A.L. Brown & J.C. Campione, Psychological Theory and the Study of
Learning Disabilities, 14 AM. PSYCH. 1059, 1066 (1986)).
239
Diamond et al., supra note 11, at 1538.
240
See Beginnings, supra note 226.
241
For a detailed meta-analysis of more than fifty years of studies supporting the effectiveness of
Direct Instruction techniques, see generally Jean Stockard, Timothy W. Wood, Cristy Coughlin & Caitlin
235
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Direct Instruction should be useful in any “well-structured”242 content area.
“Well-structured” is undefined, but when viewing the subjects covered, the
common threads are apparent. Math, language, reading, the sciences—each
of these disciplines contains a well-developed body of knowledge founded,
in large part, upon predictable, structured systems and rules. What could be
more structured than the legal profession? The entire common law system is
predicated on the idea that similar cases should produce similar results,243
and the very existence of projects like the Restatements of Law, which seek
to articulate the underlying principles of common law,244 speak to the “wellstructured” nature of the legal system. Thus, Direct Instruction techniques
should prove just as helpful in the courtroom as they have in the classroom.
Accordingly, taking as true that jurors can be viewed as novice legal learners,
and that Direct Instruction significantly promotes learning in “wellstructured” subjects, such as law, how might Direct Instruction principles
inform courtroom procedures? The next Section addresses that question.
C. Recommended Procedures
In view of jurors’ status as novice legal learners, and with the Direct
Instruction principles discussed above kept firmly in mind, this Note
recommends the following procedures to assist juror comprehension and
deliberations. First, jurors should receive preliminary instructions in every
trial. The preliminary instructions should cover both procedural and
substantive matters, including instructions on each and every element of the
plaintiff’s presumptive claims against the defendant.245 As discussed in Part
II, preliminary instructions should help improve juror comprehension by
giving jurors a mental schema through which to analyze the evidence
presented. This reform is also entirely consistent with the Direct Instruction

Rasplica Khoury, The Effectiveness of Direct Instruction Curricula: A Meta-Analysis of a Half Century
of Research, 88 REV. EDUC. RSCH. 479 (2018).
242
Rosenshine, supra note 227, at 235. Professor Barak Rosenshine suggests that Direct Instruction
is effective for teaching “mathematical procedures and computations, reading decoding, science facts and
concepts, social studies facts and concepts, map skills, grammatical concepts and rules, and foreign
language vocabulary and grammar,” as well as “complex cognitive skills such as writing essays, reading
comprehension, and problem solving in mathematics.” Id.
243
The American Legal System, LUMEN, https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundlesspoliticalscience/chapter/the-american-legal-system/ [https://perma.cc/L9UU-H4HF] (“The general
principle in common law legal systems is that similar cases should be decided so as to give similar and
predictable outcomes, and the principle of precedent is the mechanism by which this goal is attained.”).
244
See infra note 250 for an example of one of the general common law rules embodied in the
Restatement Second of Torts.
245
See supra Section II.A.4 for a discussion of preliminary instructions.
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principle that learners should be provided with an overview or outline when
engaging with unfamiliar material for the first time.246
Second, the trial should be conducted in short segments, not unlike the
bifurcation of issues already commonly used. However, unlike bifurcation,
the introduction of evidence in this scenario should be limited not to a single,
large-scale issue, such as liability in a personal injury case, but rather to a
single element of a claim, such as the intent requirement of battery. Much
like the bifurcation procedures described in Part II,247 this method would
allow jurors to benefit from concentrating on discrete, manageable
components of a legal claim to a greater degree than is allowed by more
conventional bifurcation procedures. Direct Instruction principles suggest
that by breaking jury deliberations into smaller steps, jurors might be
relieved of some of the cognitive overload they might otherwise experience
when engaging with unfamiliar legal concepts. To further accommodate
limitations on human working memory, interim instructions should also be
provided at the beginning of each trial segment, in both written and oral
form, regarding the relevant element of the claim (e.g., intent in a battery
claim).248 This should assist jurors in moving the relevant legal concepts out
of working memory and into long-term memory, where they might more
easily be applied to reach a correct verdict in the case at hand.
Third, after all of the evidence on a particular element is introduced,
jurors should be permitted to deliberate solely on that element. Moreover, in
keeping with the Direct Instruction principle that learners should have ample
opportunities for feedback, jurors should be permitted to ask clarifying
questions of the court at any time during deliberations.249 The judge should
have considerable latitude to provide clarification in response to these
questions. In particular, this Note recommends that judges, where needed,
provide examples of factual scenarios that would or would not satisfy a
particular element of a claim. Of course, caution is needed to avoid biasing
the jurors in their efforts to independently reach a correct verdict. Any
clarifying factual examples should be provided only with the consent of both
parties and should remain at a relatively high level of abstraction that avoids
close resemblance to the facts of the case. As a model for these examples,

246

See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.A.5 for a discussion of bifurcation procedures.
248
Interim instructions are permissible and have been endorsed by some scholars for use in
particularly complex trials. See, e.g., Grenig, supra note 3, at 94; Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury
Instructions into the Twenty-First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 499 (2006).
249
For a thorough discussion of procedures surrounding juror questions to the court, see Nancy S.
Marder, Answering Jurors’ Questions: Next Steps in Illinois, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 727 (2010).
247
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one might consider the examples following each provision of the various
Restatements of Law.250 These “illustrations” demonstrate how the legal
principles embodied in the Restatements can be applied to various factual
contexts and do so in fairly generic, fact-light contexts. Similarly, judgeprovided examples could be a useful scaffold251 to assist jurors during
deliberations.
If, while deliberating on any particular element of the claim, the jury
should happen to find that the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of
persuasion on that element—typically a preponderance of the evidence—
then the jury should return an early verdict for the defendant and conclude
the trial. Otherwise, the trial should continue on in these shorter segments,
with jurors receiving only the instructions necessary to deliberate on a single
element of a claim at the end of each segment. This would improve juror
comprehension because it will give jurors the opportunity to deliberate on
narrower, more easily understandable issues from which they can, per
Professor Barak Rosenshine, “explain, elaborate, or defend”252 their positions
to their fellow jurors. Combined with the freely available clarification from
the court, this deliberation structure would bring jurors closer to the “guided
practice”253 that Direct Instruction principles suggest would assist jurors in
learning to apply the law.
250

By way of example, § 13 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines battery as follows:
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other
or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. L. INST. 1965). Section 14 of the same Restatement further
provides: “To make the actor liable for a battery, the harmful bodily contact must be caused by an act
done by the person whose liability is in question.” Id. § 14. The comments then illustrate this concept: “A
pushes B against C, knocking C down and breaking his leg. A, and not B, is subject to liability to C.” Id.
§ 14 cmt. b, illus. 1.
251
Scaffolding, in the educational context, refers to a “process that enables a . . . novice to solve a
problem, carry out a task or achieve a goal which would be beyond [the novice’s] unassisted efforts.”
Janet Mannheimer Zydney, Scaffolding, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SCIENCES OF LEARNING 2913
(Norbert M. Seel ed., 2012) (quoting David Wood, Jerome S. Bruner & Gail Ross, The Role of Tutoring
in Problem Solving, 17 J. CHILD PSYCH. & PSYCHIATRY 89, 90 (1976)). The concept is derived from Lev
Vygotsky’s theory of the zone of proximal development, which posits that a learner develops most rapidly
when undertaking tasks that cannot be completed alone, but which are achievable with support and
guidance from others. Id. at 2914 (referencing Lev S. Vygotsky, Interaction Between Learning and
Development, in READINGS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN 34 (Mary Gauvain & Michael Cole
eds., 4th ed. 2005)). The “scaffolding” moniker for this concept was first coined by David Wood in 1976.
Id.
252
Rosenshine, supra note 227, at 237 (quoting Brown & Campione, supra note 238, at 1066).
253
Id.
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Of course, should a trial continue through its full course without an
early verdict for the defendant, jurors should simply receive one final,
complete set of jury instructions following the introduction of all evidence.
At this point, jurors would simply deliberate and return a general verdict in
the traditional fashion.
1. Compatibility with Existing Trial Mechanisms
Although these procedures are novel, they comport with existing trial
mechanisms. Preliminary instructions are, as stated above, permitted by Rule
51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.254 Thus, the introduction of
preliminary and interim instructions throughout the trial should not be
especially controversial. Likewise, as explained in Part II, written
instructions are permitted in all United States jurisdictions and seem to
provide some modest benefits for juror comprehension.255 Furthermore,
although bifurcation is typically applied to separate larger issues, such as
causation and damages, Rule 42(b) is agnostic as to the level of issue that is
separated out for consideration.256 The Rule explicitly allows for the
segmenting of issues into separate trials, so it should be no technical obstacle
to segmenting the admission of evidence by element during the course of a
single trial. The element-by-element deliberation also bears substantial
similarity to the special-verdict and special-interrogatory procedures
described in Part II.257 And, again, the submission of questions from jurors to
the court is permissible in many jurisdictions and has been enthusiastically
endorsed by some scholars.258
2. Alignment with Educational Theory
These procedures are not only theoretically viable, but also align with
research and relevant educational principles. Research with college students
suggests that an average learner’s attention span is measured in minutes, not
hours.259 Thus, it is reasonable to think that juror attention spans are equally

254

FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3).
See supra notes 122–135 and accompanying text for a discussion of written instructions.
256
FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
257
See supra notes 136–171 and accompanying text.
258
See, e.g., Marder, supra note 249, at 502 (encouraging courts to allow jurors to submit questions
prior to deliberations and suggesting the jurors who are allowed to do so “achieve[] a better understanding
of jury instructions than those who [do] not”).
259
See Paul Marcus, Judges Talking to Jurors in Criminal Cases: Why U.S. Judges Do It So
Differently from Just About Everyone Else, 30 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 1, 34–35 (2013) (discussing
research on student attention spans).
255

1218

115:1185 (2021)

Laypeople as Learners

limited.260 By dividing instructions into segments, this proposal would
provide jurors with the shorter, more manageable chunks of information that
they are accustomed to engaging with in day-to-day life.261 Furthermore,
providing jurors with more manageable amounts of information would help
alleviate the burdens on long-term memory that are associated with the
average trial.262
As explained above, this proposal also matches well with Direct
Instruction principles, which suggest that in “well-structured”263 areas of
study teachers can improve student comprehension by providing scaffolds to
reduce the difficulty of an unfamiliar task.264 This theory suggests that
because individuals have limited working memory, they will tackle new
challenges most effectively if they are asked to engage with only a few pieces
of information at a time.265 Accordingly, teachers should break information
into small steps to reduce confusion, provide an overview or outline of the
topic from the outset of new learning, and provide learners with ample
opportunities to practice with new skills.266 This proposal satisfies all of these
steps. Preliminary instructions provide an outline for the relevant legal
claims. Then, segmenting instructions and deliberations into smaller chunks
accommodates limits on jurors’ working memory, and short, frequent
periods of deliberation with the opportunity to ask questions provide jurors
with a sort of “guided practice” as they strive to correctly learn and apply the
law. Thus, this proposal would greatly assist jurors in comprehending and
accurately applying unfamiliar legal principles during the course of a trial.
3. Potential Challenges
There are several clear arguments against this proposal. The first and
most significant is that organizing jury instructions and deliberations in this
manner might raise constitutional concerns. Professor Ronald Eades, among
others, suggests that special verdicts and similar piece-by-piece deliberations
infringe upon the ability of juries to “do justice” by eliminating the right to

260
Id. at 35; see also Jaquish & Ware, supra note 222, at 1726 (stating that jurors feel their attention
is “overburdened” during trials with in-court translations).
261
See generally G. Marc Whitehead, Jury Trial Innovations: Making the Courtroom a Better Place
to Teach and Learn, 89 ALI-ABA 203, 206 (2000) (arguing that jurors are accustomed to and would
benefit from shorter bursts of information in the courtroom).
262
See Jaquish & Ware, supra note 222, at 1727 (arguing that “advocate educators” must be prepared
to assist jurors with long-term information retention during a trial).
263
Rosenshine, supra note 227, at 235.
264
Id.
265
See id.
266
Id. at 1.
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nullify.267 And it is at least arguable that, in a criminal context, jurors should
be able to nullify—an ability that might be impaired by the step-by-step
deliberations suggested by this proposal.268 But the constitutional argument
is exactly that—just one argument in a still-unsettled debate.269 Vigorous
disagreement continues as to whether jury nullification should ever be
allowed,270 and the Supreme Court itself has described jury nullification as a
power of the jury, but one not rightfully wielded.271 But even if one concludes
that jury nullification must be left intact for criminal trials, this proposal can
be limited solely to civil trials, a context in which courts uniformly reject any
right for the jury to issue a verdict contrary to the evidence.272 Indeed, the
judge in a civil trial can overrule a jury verdict that is clearly not in accord
with the evidence.273 Accordingly, there should be no significant harm from
this proposal, which merely asks that jurors consider the evidence in a
logical, stepwise fashion.
Second, some may argue that this proposal would skew trial outcomes
in one direction or another. To some extent, this concern is borne out in the
research discussed in Part II, which indicates that bifurcated trials can result
267
Ronald W. Eades, The Problem of Jury Instructions in Civil Cases, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 1017,
1024–25 (1997) (“The greatest benefit of the special interrogatory may be one of its faults. By eliminating
the jury’s ability to render a general verdict, the interrogatory prevents the jury from ‘doing justice.’”).
Many who adopt this position describe the jury as the “conscience of the community” and argue that the
jury must be empowered to nullify in order to mitigate the sometimes-harsh effects of mechanically
applying criminal laws. See, e.g., Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a
Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 111, 115 (1980) (“The jury, with its power of nullification,
is a deliberate attempt to increase citizen participation in government, ameliorate the rigors of laws that
may be too harsh when applied in certain cases, prevent governmental tyranny, bring the law and the
community in closer harmony, and allow the people to make the final decision on moral blameworthiness
in criminal cases.”).
268
See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) (“There is no easier way to
reach, and perhaps to force, a verdict of guilty than to approach it step by step. A juror, wishing to acquit,
may be formally catechized. By a progression of questions each of which seems to require an answer
unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a conviction which, in the large, he
would have resisted.”).
269
For an especially thorough treatment of why jury nullification should not be permitted, see Steven
M. Warshawsky, Note, Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 GEO.
L.J. 191 (1996).
270
It is beyond the scope of this Note to address the wide-ranging arguments surrounding the topic
of jury nullification. For an excellent bibliography identifying the major scholarly writings on both sides
of the jury nullification debate, the curious reader can consult Teresa L. Conaway, Carol L. Mutz & Joann
M. Ross, Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 393 (2004).
271
“[I]t is [the jury’s] duty to be governed by the instructions of the court as to all legal questions . . . .
They have the power to do otherwise, but the exercise of such power cannot be regarded as rightful . . . .”
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 83 (1895) (quoting Duffy v. People, 26 N.Y. 588, 592 (1863)).
272
Eades, supra note 267, at 1030.
273
This refers to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
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in greater numbers of pro-defendant verdicts.274 But there are two responses
to this. First, it is possible that the verdicts reached in bifurcated trials are in
fact fairer insofar as jurors cannot as easily “fuse” evidence from different
phases of the trial, such as evidence on liability and damages.275 As Professor
Diamond’s study with the Arizona Jury Project suggests, jurors are at times
inclined to bypass essential elements of a claim, such as negligence, in their
haste to recompense a clearly injured plaintiff.276 Second, the existing
research also shows that plaintiffs who manage to prevail in a bifurcated trial
generally receive larger verdicts.277 True, this might suggest that jurors in
bifurcated trials hold back on finding liability except in the most egregious
of cases. But a different, equally plausible framing is that juries in bifurcated
trials are empowered to more rationally consider the case without allowing
their sympathy for the plaintiff’s injuries to cloud their view of whether the
defendant caused those injuries. Absent more definitive research on this
phenomenon, it may well be that bifurcated trials merely produce different,
rather than less fair, verdicts.
Finally, one might imagine that this Note’s proposed procedures would
slow down the course of a trial. However, the existing research on bifurcation
suggests the opposite—bifurcated trials typically take less time, not more.278
Although trials that run their full course could take longer using the proposed
procedures, many others could be concluded earlier if the jury quickly finds
that a single dispositive element279 of the claim fails for the plaintiff.
Admittedly, some evidence pertinent to multiple elements of a claim
might need to be introduced to jurors repeatedly. For instance, in our
hypothetical products liability case,280 jurors might be introduced to
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See supra notes 200–214 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, From Compassion to Compensation: The Effect of Injury Severity
on Mock Jurors’ Liability Judgements, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1477, 1485 (1998) (finding that greater
plaintiff injuries led to more frequent findings of liability when testing mock jurors). In other words, it
appears that when faced with a severely injured plaintiff, jurors are more inclined to find someone (read:
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See Zeisel & Callahan, supra note 200, at 1624 (finding that trial bifurcation saves an average of
20% of the time that the trial would take using nonbifurcated proceedings).
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To be clear, this Note does not propose holding separate trials as to each element of a claim.
Rather, it proposes that jurors be allowed to recess intermittently during the course of a single trial to
deliberate on specific elements of a claim. Bifurcation traditionally results in separate trials, albeit often
with the same jury. For instance, in a mass tort case, the first trial might address liability, and the second,
if needed, might address damages. This Note’s proposal speaks to subtrial units of analysis; jurors might,
for example, be allowed time to deliberate solely on the issue of proximate cause while sitting for a trial
on the larger issue of liability.
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See supra Introduction.
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incriminating emails from the defendant twice—once to establish that the
defendant knew how dangerous their vaping products were, and again to
establish that the defendant misrepresented that danger to the consuming
public. At first blush, this might seem a magnificent waste of time. But the
news wouldn’t be all bad. This is because repetition facilitates evidence
recall via “overlearning.”281 Thus, any repetition caused by the proposed
procedures would aid jurors during deliberations by facilitating easier recall
of the most sensitive evidence—namely, the evidence bearing on multiple
elements of a claim. And, of course, budget-conscious litigants will continue
pushing their attorneys to operate efficiently. Accordingly, structuring
deliberations around discrete elements of a claim might encourage the
parties’ attorneys to more concisely tie their presentations directly to the
elements of the claim or even to stipulate to the existence of any undisputed
elements of the claim.
Admittedly, there is some risk that allowing jurors to return an early
verdict would incentivize them to find against the plaintiff early in the trial
in order to avoid further jury duty. Trial simulations with mock jurors might
better establish whether this concern has any basis in reality. As noted above,
existing research suggests that jurors try hard to fulfill their duties, 282 so this
concern may only be theoretical.
4. Establishing Viability
This proposal fuses aspects of existing trial mechanisms with principles
drawn from the Direct Instruction educational theory in an effort to create
trial procedures which will further assist jurors in comprehending and
applying legal instructions. However, before this proposal can be attempted,
it would be wise to attempt trial simulations using mock jurors to assess the
procedure’s impact on juror comprehension.
A key consideration in structuring such a study is selecting appropriate
comprehension measures. Earlier studies have sometimes used paraphrasing
tests, which are obviously more challenging on average than the basic recall
involved in a multiple-choice assessment. Thus, paraphrasing tests could
result in underestimating juror comprehension. On the other hand, it is
conceivable that multiple choice or recall assessments might overestimate
juror comprehension because the cognitive effort needed for these tasks
might be less than is required to accurately apply the legal principles
reflected in the jury instructions. It might be best to emulate Professor
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Jaquish & Ware, supra note 222, at 1727 (“Over-learning is essentially the result of repetition
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Diamond’s approach with the Arizona Jury Project by recording mock juror
deliberations and assessing how well the participants’ commentary reflects
the instructions provided. If preliminary studies suggest increased juror
comprehension, it would then be prudent to undertake more extensive trial
simulations in order to assess the effect of this procedure on trial length. At
that point, it might be feasible to attempt this proposal with live juries.
CONCLUSION
Let’s revisit our hypothetical products liability case from the beginning
of this Note.283 There, the defendants—the ones producing dangerous vaping
products—escaped liability because the jury erroneously applied a
contributory negligence defense that was simply inapplicable in that
jurisdiction. Let’s call this version of reality “World 1.” What would have
happened in an alternate reality where the trial had been restructured to
accommodate the Direct Instruction principles described above? We can call
this reality “World 2.”
First, the jurors might be a little less perplexed right out of the gate. At
the start of the trial, they receive an overview from the judge of the relevant
legal principles—in this case, the requirements for a strict product liability
claim based on the defendant’s intentional misrepresentation of the dangers
inherent in its vaping products. From the beginning, the jurors know that the
plaintiffs’ claims require proof (1) that the defendant’s vaping products were
unreasonably dangerous; (2) that the defendant misrepresented that danger;
(3) that the plaintiffs relied on those misrepresentations; and, of course, (4)
that they were injured as a result. Undoubtedly, the jurors are already
benefitting from developing an initial understanding of the relevant legal
framework, perhaps with the aid of a set of written preliminary instructions
for their reference. They might even take a few notes on the judge’s
explanation of particular points of law.
As World 2’s version of the case continues, the judge’s decision to
segment the trial into shorter pieces makes things a little easier for the jury.
After reviewing, for instance, the requirement that the vaping products must
have been unreasonably dangerous, the jurors know to focus their attention
solely on this narrow factual issue. They can concentrate closely on both
parties’ presentations to see whether this requirement has actually been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. And before engaging with an
overwhelming amount of new evidence, the jurors have the chance to recess
together to discuss this element of the claim. They can share their views on
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the relative strength of each side’s presentation, and they have the
opportunity to reconcile any differing views of the evidence.
In later segments of the trial, the jurors start to notice some repetition.
For instance, they see that, in repeatedly focusing on some of the defendant’s
unsavory internal emails, the plaintiffs are establishing both the
dangerousness of the vaping products as well as the defendant’s decision to
downplay that danger. The jurors zero in on this information, and it comes
up repeatedly during their separate discussions of both the “unreasonable
dangerousness” and “misrepresentation” elements of the claim.
At one point, well into the trial, the jurors begin deliberating on the
reliance element of the plaintiffs’ claims. At first, they struggle—several
jurors are confused as to how a seemingly individual question of reliance is
going to be proven on a class-wide basis. Unable to settle the issue alone, the
jurors submit a question to the judge, who, having first shared the question
with both parties’ counsel, clarifies that this jurisdiction permits an inference
of reliance without requiring proof on a plaintiff-by-plaintiff basis.
Eventually, all of the presentations are complete, and the jurors are
prepared to deliberate. They receive final instructions from the judge, largely
nodding along as they recognize the now-familiar legal principles involved.
The jurors retreat to the deliberation room as the litigants nervously wait.
The final deliberations aren’t easy. The jurors come into the room with
different backgrounds and experiences, and not all of them have the same
view of the evidence. But what they share is a common understanding of the
legal rules they are being asked to apply; there is no contention over those.
In that sense, their legal education for this trial has been a success.
One thing that never occurs to them? Contributory negligence. All of
the defendant’s affirmative defenses had been presented earlier, during a
separate segment of the trial. The jurors know that the plaintiffs’ individual
decisions to use vaping products, even while aware of some possible
dangers, simply have no bearing on this lawsuit. In fact, when they discussed
defenses the first time, they decided to submit a question to the judge on this
very issue. In short order, they received clarification that contributory
negligence does not apply in this jurisdiction.
The case remains a nail-biter to the end. Still, having thoughtfully
deliberated on the case, the jurors eventually return a verdict: the defendant
is liable. The class of injured plaintiffs will be made whole.
World 2’s ending is certainly different from World 1’s and is of course
a much happier ending for the plaintiffs. But it is also a better ending for the
legal system generally. In this world, the defendants didn’t escape liability
solely by grace of a sensible but legally incorrect misunderstanding on the
part of the jurors. And the jurors themselves had a more satisfying
1224
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experience. They had more support to understand their charge, and they had
the resources they needed to engage in productive deliberations. Each juror
felt more secure in their verdict than in World 1, and many were grateful for
the opportunity to serve.
Perhaps World 2 seems a shade utopian. But isn’t it better than the
status quo? Adopting even some of the proposed procedures could take us
closer to World 2, even if imperfectly so. And we have every reason to want
to do so. True, there are promising signs that jurors might comprehend
instructions to a greater degree than previously thought. But existing
empirical research still suggests that juror comprehension is lacking. And a
juror’s struggle to comprehend can result in severe consequences,
particularly in capital sentencing cases. Existing reforms have somewhat
mitigated this risk, but they are not a cure-all, and there remains substantial
room for improvement. By incorporating educational principles into the
courtroom, some of this dangerous gap in juror comprehension can be filled.
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